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The nature of money received as compensation for the early termination of a contract has 
been determined by Case Law to be of capital or revenue nature to depend on the 
prevailing circumstances of each case.  This paper evaluates Case Law and the principles 
contained therein which individually or cumulatively provide the guidelines of what 
presiding Judges have considered make compensation received from the termination of a 
contract to be of a capital or revenue nature. The cases under study will be those from 
South African courts as well as other jurisdictions which have had similar cases brought 






Leach AJA, when delivering his Judgement in the WJ Fourie Beleggings CC v Commissioner 
SARS1, said that the case before him differed from those relied upon by the Appellant (i.e. WJ 
Fourie Beleggings) in its presentation to the Court in that in those cases the Appellant relied 
upon, the contract terminated was an income producing asset2.That is, it was part of the income 
earning structure of the Appellant3. The compensation received from the early termination of 
such contracts were thus of a capital nature, the judge concluded.  However, in the current case 
before the distinguished Judge, the Appellant had, even before the inception of the contract in 
question, conducted its business as a hotelier. The Judge argued that, the terminated contract, 
albeit a significant contributor to the total income of the Appellant, was thus not the means for 
the Appellant to earn income at all4.  The Appellant, the Judge argued, could still conduct its 
business of being a hotelier without the contract being in effect, as it had done before. As such, it 
was not of part of the income earning structure and was not of a capital nature. The Judge ruled 
that the compensation was consequently of an income nature and was fully taxable. 
 
Leach AJA had in this Judgement added to the incumbent list of characterises that Judges have 
through time used to ascertain whether the compensation received for the early termination of a 
contract is of a capital or revenue nature. As “capital” nature is not defined in the Income Tax 
Act of (1962), it has been left to the Courts to decide on what make payments or receipts of a 
capital or revenue nature. It is thus the objective of this Thesis to discuss the Case Law regarding 
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the taxable nature of the compensation received for the early termination of a contract and the 
reasons given by the presiding Judges on why they ruled those receipts to be of a revenue and not 
of a capital nature or vice versa. The objective is to collate these characteristics with the view to 
assist taxpayer in his tax planning by providing him with characteristics that have previously 
been used by presiding judges to distinguish between revenue and capital nature of the 
compensation received for termination of a contract. In pre-empting these characteristics the 
taxpayer can similarly adjust his own characteristics to achieve the desired outcome – to pay less 
tax. 
 
Admittedly a comprehensive list of the determinants of a capital or revenue nature is not always 
possible to obtain as each case is different and the Judgements given would have depended on 
the circumstances prevailing in each case. Thus the objective is to provide a guideline on the 
circumstances that have prevailed in the cases that will be discussed and how these were used by 
the presiding Judges to determine if compensation received for the termination of a contract were 
of a revenue or a capital nature. This may then be used by taxpayers as a guide of the 
circumstances that have existed for compensation received to be of a capital nature. Ensuring 
these are similar to their own circumstances may lead compensation receipts to also be taxed as 
capital receipts by the Tax Authority.  
 
If successful, this will result in the taxpayers (excluding tax exempt entities) paying less tax. Per 
Income Tax 58 of 1962, as amended, natural taxpayers, individual policy holders and special 




the full inclusion in taxable income that would result if these receipts were found to be of a 
revenue nature and taxed accordingly5. Non-natural taxpayers such as companies will only have 
66.6% of the receipts included in taxable income if the receipts are also of a capital nature6.  
 
The Thesis has the following structure: first, the general principles determining revenue vs. 
capital nature will be discussed. Then after the types of compensation receipts will be analysed. 
Thirdly, an investigation will be made on how termination of a particular contract - which is a 
trade contract and is the subject of this thesis - gives rise to compensation receipts. This 
preamble, of course, will lead to an evaluation of the Judgements made on the nature of 
compensation receipts from a termination of a contract. This will include Judgements made on 
similar cases in other jurisdictions with a legal framework similar to that of South Africa. Next is 
an analysis will be made of two recent cases that are the current authority in South Africa on this 
matter:  WJ Fourie Beleggings CC v Commissioner and Case 11470 and Stellenbosch Farmers’ 
Winery v Commissioner for SA Revenue Service.  Then after, the nuances that have made Judges 
rule that compensation receipts from the termination of a trade contract were of a capital or 
revenue nature in all the cases discussed will be collated and evaluated. This assessment will 
include discussions on how the judgements may have changed or stayed the same given differing 
circumstances. The lessons learned there will then be used to analyse the nature of compensation 
receipts in a small case study. Then lastly, a conclusion will follow. 
 
                                                       






2. Gross Income: Capital vs. Revenue 
 
 
Gross income, as defined in Section 1 the Income Tax Act reads7: 
“Gross income, in relation to any year or period of assessment means- 
(i) In the case of any resident, the total amount, in cash or otherwise, received by or 
accrued to or in favour of such resident; or 
(ii) In the  case of any person other than a resident , the total amount, in cash or otherwise 
receive by or accrued to or in favour of such person from a source within or deemed 
to be within the Republic, 
during such year or period of assessment, excluding receipts of accruals of a capital nature….” 
 
However the Income Tax Act does not define what capital nature is. This was left to the Courts 
to define. Hence the Case Law that currently guides the definition of capital nature.  It is this 
Case Law that will then provide the framework to what the Courts have used to distinguish 
between compensation receipts of a capital and revenue nature.  
 
The underlying principle in the debate of a capital vs. revenue nature asset is best explained by 
the analogy of fruit vs. tree. A capital asset, the analogy explains, is the tree from which fruit 
(income) come8. The proceeds of the sale of assets (whether the asset is corporeal or incorporeal) 
take its nature from that of the asset sold. It follows then that the proceeds from a sale of a capital 
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asset will be of capital nature.  The proceeds from a revenue type asset like e.g. trading stock will 
also be of a revenue asset.  The point is further reiterated in the cases below.  
 
Wessels JA in his judgement in CIR vs. Stott9 ruled that an important factor that makes receipts 
from the sale of assets to be of a capital or revenue is the intention with which the said asset was 
first acquired10.  Later in 1975 Holmes JA ruled, in Natal Estates Ltd vs. SIR11, that there can be 
a change in this original intension that alters the nature of the proceeds from the sale of the assets 
from capital to revenue nature12. To explain the context of this ruling: Natal Estates had acquired 
land with the intension of holding it as capital. Later, however, Natal Estates realised that the 
land could be used for township development activities and started to sell it toward that end13. 
The original intention had thus changed to selling the land as trading stock which meant that the 
receipts were not of a capital but were of a revenue14.  In other words, Natal Estates had 
embarked on a scheme of profit making and that made the receipts from the asset sold to be of a 
revenue nature15. 
 
This sentiment is echoed again in CIR v Pick ‘n Pay Employee Share Purchase Trust16.  The 
intension behind setting up the trust was for the employees of Pick n Pay to own its shares17. The 
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incidental profit made from the buying and selling of the shares did not change this original 
intention to one of a scheme of profit making, held the presiding Judge Smallberger JA18.  
 
However capital or revenue nature is not only applicable to the proceeds of the sale of asset. 
Income receipts can come from a variety of sources, for example: services rendered and income 
from owing assets like rental property; and each will have its own taxable nature.  It is, however, 
the receipts from the termination of contracts that will be subject matter under discussion for this 
Thesis. 
 
Usually the party wishing to terminate any contract pays compensation for early termination of 
that contract to the other party. The contract in question may be an employment contract, 
cancellation of a lease contract, or a trading contract.  In fact, it was the uncertainty of the nature 
of receipts from the termination of an employment contract that led to its specific inclusion in 
paragraph (f) of the Gross income definition in the Income Tax Act. That paragraph makes the 
receipt from termination of an employment contract to be of a revenue nature and thus fully 
taxable as was found to be the case in ITC 619. In that case the Appellant had his employment 
contract terminated 2 years prior to the contract stipulated end date and the presiding Judge 
found that receipt to be of a revenue nature20. These compensation receipts are of a revenue 
nature despite them being lump sums or not.  The nature of compensation receipts from the 
cancellation of a lease contract is also revenue.  This is so as gross income definition of the 
Income Tax Act paragraph (g) specifically deems lease premiums - monies received in lieu of 
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higher lease income- to be of revenue nature.  Less obvious, however, is the nature of 
compensation receipts from the termination of a trading contract/agreement because the taxable 
treatment of this is not included in any paragraph in the Gross Income definition of the Income 
Tax Act.  
 
A trading contract is characterised by two parties agreeing to the terms of a contract where one 
party requires the services of the other. Should the need no longer exist for the services agreed to 
one party (Party A) may terminate the contract, before the end date of such a contract, should the 
other party (Party B) agree. However, compensation for the early termination of this contract 
must be paid by the party wishing to terminate the contract (Party A).  The issue is then whether 
the compensation receipts of Party B are of a capital or revenue nature. This question has been 
the reason why so many individuals and companies have gone to court to contest tax assessments 
issued by the South African Revenue Services as evidenced by the cases discussed below.  
 
3. Compensation for the Early Termination of a Trading Contract: A Historical 
Analysis  of Compensation Receipts Cases from 1975 to date 
 
Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd had entered into an agency contract21. This necessitated setting up 
a fully functioning business operation as a result of the new business afforded to it by the 
contract. Consequently, premises were acquired to house the business and personnel to run it to 
ensure that the contractual obligations were met. In 1975, the agency agreement was prematurely 
terminated and Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd received compensation in that regard.  When the 
                                                       




authorities for Inland Revenue taxed the full amount as revenue receipts, Taeuber and Corssen 
(Pty) Ltd took the matter to court.  It is important to note that the Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd, 
had an established income earning structure before the advent of this contract but Rumpff CJ, the 
presiding Judge, emphasised the fact that the (specific) agency business was a significant 
contributor to the Appellant’s business and it was in itself a section of the income producing 
structure22 . As that section of the income producing structure had been sterilized by the 
termination of the contract, the compensation received for its early termination was of a capital 
nature.  
 
Two years after the Judgement above, another case of a similar nature was brought before the 
Courts: ITC 125923.  The taxpayer had a management agreement with a privately held company. 
The taxpayer per the agreement was tasked, inter alia, to act as a selling agent for properties 
owned by the said company.   The taxpayer had hired additional staff to create capacity for the 
new business the contract afforded it. This staff was in addition to the staff complement that 
already formed part of the established income earning structure of the taxpayer which was a 
property management business.  Notably  this contract represented a substantial portion of the 
income produced by the taxpayer24.  However, shortly after the conclusion of the contract, there 
was a change in the ownership of the privately held company. The new owner terminated the 
contract the newly acquired company had with the taxpayer and the new owner paid the taxpayer 
a sum of money as compensation. Using Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR as authority, the 
Court ruled that the monies received for the early termination of the contract were of a capital 
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nature, citing among their reasons the fact that the contract had contributed a substantial portion 
of income in the overall income generated by the income earning structure of the taxpayer25. 
 
The Judgement of the case above bears a resemblance to that made in ITC 134126.  The facts of 
this case were that the Appellant was formed by the merger of two entities27.  It was the business 
of the Appellant to register the transfer of shares. These entities were themselves holding 
companies which, given the agreement between themselves and the Appellant, made their 
subsidiaries employ only the services of the Appellant. When one of the entities were acquired 
by a third party several years later, the agreement between the acquired entity and the Appellant 
was terminated because the acquired entity intended to use the share transfer department of the 
acquirer.  
 
Compensation for the termination of the agreement was paid and the Tax Authority fully taxed 
the sum as it regarded it to be of a revenue nature28.  It argued that the payments were simply 
compensation for the loss of future income29.   But the presiding Judge of ITC 1341 disagreed 
and ruled that the compensation receipts were in fact of a capital nature because a portion of the 
income producing structure of the Appellant had permanently been severed by losing the 
acquired entity’s business30.  
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Thus the similarity between this case and ITC 1259: the income earning structure was itself 
impaired by the termination of the contract.  The compensation was thus paid for having 
impaired the structure.  Therefore the receipts were of a capital nature as they were payments 
made for having impaired a capital asset. 
 
So far the Judgements made in the above cases (Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR, ITC 1259 
and/or ITC 1341) reveal two characteristics that the Judges had used to distinguish between 
receipts of a capital or revenue nature. The first is that the terminated contract represented a 
substantial portion of overall income generated by the aggrieved taxpayers31. The second was 
that the contract had resulted in the taxpayer having formed, in addition to an already established 
income earning structure, extra capacity that would attend to the new business resulting from the 
contract32. These factors would were important deliberations when the presiding Judges 
determined whether compensation receipts for the termination of said contracts were of a 
revenue or capital nature. 
 
The principal of linking the contract to the income earning structure in assessing whether receipts 
are of a capital or revenue nature is by no means a new concept as evidenced by the earlier case 
of BOS vs. C: SARS (TPD)33. In that case in 1945, a Judgement was made that relied on this link 
to assess the nature of compensation receipts. The facts of the case were that a partnership 
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arrangement that the taxpayer was party to was prematurely terminated.  Compensation was paid 
and the Revenue Service considered these receipts to be of a revenue nature and taxed them as 
such. A disagreement ensued between the taxpayer and the Tax Authority and the matter was 
brought to Court. The Judgement was that the receipts were indeed of a capital nature and the 
reason cited was that the partnership arrangement was the very cornerstone of the taxpayer’s 
income earning structure34. That is to say the formation of the partnership and the income it 
produced was the direct result of the contract in question. The Court ruled that, given this 
correlation, the conclusion was clear:  of a capital nature too then was compensation received for 
the early termination of the contract.  As these services were the only means of earning an 
income for the taxpayer, the Judge ruled that the termination of the contract thus cut of the 
income earning structure itself – a capital asset of the taxpayer. As such the compensation was 
capital in nature. 
 
With the authority thus established in South African Courts, cases further afield in other 
jurisdictions would blur the lines between capital and revenue nature to the extent that they 
would receive mention in South African Academic books (Emslie et al (2011): 105) . Emslie et 
al draw attention to the Judgement in Allied Mills Industries (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner 
of Taxation in the United States of America35. The taxpayer, in that case, had a distribution 
agreement that gave it the sole right to distribute certain biscuit products.  This business was only 
part of the taxpayer’s several businesses. This distribution agreement was more than just the 
means to produce income, but rather, it produced profits itself. This, the Tax Authority, argued 
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was evident even in intent of paying the compensation when the contract was terminated. It 
argued that the payment of the counterparty to the taxpayer was made to compensate the latter 
for loss of revenue that resulted from the termination of the contract and thus the compensation 
was of a revenue nature.   
 
This introduces a nuance: where taxpayers’ have contracts cancelled and compensation is 
received for the loss of revenue that would have accrued to the taxpayer had the contract still 
been in effect, these receipts are usually of a revenue nature as was found to be the case in Allied 
Mills Industries (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation 36. Also, presiding Judges have, in 
deciding whether receipts are of a capital or revenue nature, considered how significant the 
contract in question was to the overall business of the taxpayer37. Emslie et al (2011: 105) makes 
the point that this draws attention to the fact that it matters then the nature of the contract 
(distribution, agency etc) and the reason for the termination of the contract.  This is because in 
Allied Mills Industries (Pty) Ltd the Court held that given; the fact that the distribution agreement 
resulted in a profit being made, that the contract was not simply the means to those profits and 
the contract contributed but a small portion of the taxpayer’s income, the compensation received 
for its termination was thus of a revenue nature38. 
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In earlier English cases such as Glenboig Union Fireclay & Co Ltd v IRC39 and California 
Copper Products Ltd (in liquidation) v FCT40, the Courts held that compensation receipts were 
of a capital nature because  the termination of the contract was effectively the termination of the 
taxpayers’ business - which is a capital asset41 . Of interest is the observation that, in California 
Copper Products Ltd (in liquidation) v FCT , the Judgement was reinforced by the fact that the 
receipts had not been calculated with reference to forgone revenue (or income). This is despite 
the compensation having been received made in recurring instalments . The manner in which the 
compensation is received is therefore unimportant. This is because compensation receipts can be 
one lump sum amount (which implies a capital amount) or a recurring amount paid over time 
(implying revenue). The Judgement of the Court in California Copper Products Ltd (in 
liquidation) v FCT made it clear that the frequency of receipt is not necessarily indicative of the 
nature of the receipts42. Rather, the capital nature of the compensation receipt is determined by 
the fact that the termination of the contract permanently impaired the income structure43. So, by 
deduction, the manner in which the resulting compensation was paid does not determine the 
nature of the compensation. 
 
Whereas the frequency with which the compensation is received did not determine the nature of 
those receipts in California Copper Products Ltd (in liquidation) v FCT, their timing may play an 
important factor in determining the taxable nature of compensation receipts:  consider the 
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Australian case of Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT44.  To explain the relevance of this case to the 
discussion on whether the timing of the compensation receipts plays a factor in determining their 
nature, consider the context of the case below.  
 
The taxpayer had a mining agreement that afforded it with the right to mine a mineral. To do 
this, the mine subsequently purchased machinery. As is customary in the mining sector, the mine 
also entered into supply contracts with the buyers of the raw minerals that were mined. This is 
done to secure, for the mine, buyers of the mined mineral.  However, the demand of the mineral 
fell in the years after the contracts were in effect. The fall in demand affected the counterparties 
that entered into supply contracts with Heavy Metal because they had a declining number of 
customers to sell the acquired mineral to.  That is, while the mine had supply contracts, the 
counterparties to the contract had a falling demand from the customers they on sale the mineral.  
The counterparties requested to cancel the contracts and decided to pay a lump sum of money as 
compensation.  
 
At this stage the Heavy Metals (having admitted the inevitable) had already decided to close its 
mine and had resorted to buying the mineral from other mines in order to fulfil its obligations per 
the supply contract.  Of note is the fact that the supply contracts were cancelled after the mine 
began to close down.  This, held the presiding Judge Windeyer J, only aided in making the 
compensation receipts of a revenue nature.  The Judge maintained that the supply contracts did 
not represent a means to produce income (the mine was the means to produce an income). This, 
                                                       




together with the fact that the compensation was received after the mine had closed and the 
capital asset permanently impaired, resulted in the receipts being of a revenue nature. Thus the 
timing of the compensation receipt was important in this case. Because it was received after the 
capital asset (the mine) had been impaired, they were thus of a revenue nature. 
 
To sum up, the analysis of cases from other jurisdictions revealed further characteristics that 
determine the taxable nature of compensation receipts, in addition to the two characteristics from 
the domestic cases- which are the significance of the contract to the income earning structure and 
whether the terminated contract impaired the income earning structure. The first characteristic 
from the analysis of foreign cases is: where the terminated contract provided just some of the 
business to the taxpayers’ many types of businesses, then the contract is not seen as part of the 
income earning structure and is of a revenue nature45. Secondly, calculating compensation by 
measuring forgone income because of the termination of a contract usually results in revenue 
authorities arguing that the compensation was thus of a revenue nature46. The third characteristic 
is that the manner that the compensation is received - whether it is a lump sum or recurring 
amount - does not determine its taxable nature because compensation that was paid in recurring 
amounts was nevertheless regarded as capital47.  Then lastly, the timing of the compensation 
receipts may play an important factor in assessing their taxable nature48. It may be argued in the 
above case of Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT that had the compensation been received before the 
decision to close the mine, then this may have led the Court to decide the receipt were of a 
capital nature because the capital asset, the mine, had not been impaired and the mineral mined 
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could still be mined49.   However, because the mine had already been closed when the 
compensation was received, the Court could not argue that the compensation was paid for the 
impaired a capital asset. This is because at the time it was the compensation was received, the 
mine had already closed and the asset already impaired. Therefore compensation received was of 
a revenue nature50. 
 
4. Analysis of Recent South African Cases 
 
A. WJ Fourie Beleggings CC v Commissioner (SARS) [2009] (5) SA 238 (SCA) 
This was the context of the case: WJ Fourie Beleggings had always conducted the business of 
being a hotelier. It leased Elgro Hotel in Potchefstroom from Bultfontein Property Investments 
(Pty) Ltd. In April 2001, it entered into an agreement with Naschem which was a division of 
Denel (Pty) Ltd. This agreement entailed that WJ Fourie Beleggings accommodate members of 
the forces of the United Arab Emirates in its hotels from April 2001 to 30 May 200351. These 
members were receiving training in South Africa during this period that was provided by 
Naschem.  A significant number of hotel rooms were thus set aside to provide accommodation 
for the members that were staying for various periods. Furthermore, resources were dedicated to 
provide meals to these members during their stay in the said hotel52.  
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The contract - i.e. the trade agreement between WJ Fourie Belleggings and Naschem- was worth 
approximately R 8.7 million and the Appellant, WJ Fourie Beleggings, began providing 
accommodation from April 2001 as stipulated in the contract53.  To secure this contract, WJ 
Fourie Beleggings CC had to effect several structural changes to the hotel to prove that the hotel 
was able to accommodate the large number of anticipated students. However in September of 
2001, the students left the hotel.  The terrorist attacks on the World Trade Centre in September 
may have prompted their sudden departure.  Yet they, suddenly and without warning, left 
without citing any reason. Furthermore, the students had left the hotel rooms in complete 
disrepair.   
 
The swift departure of these students led Naschem to cancel the agreement with the Appellant. 
At that date the Appellant had only earned R 4 million from this contract54. The Appellant then 
demanded compensation for breach of contract and threatened to take the matter to court. The 
dispute was however settled out of court and in the year of assessment ending 28 February 2002, 
the Appellant received R 1292 760 as full and final settlement for all claims it had against 
Naschem55.  
 
The full amount was included in the tax assessment of the Appellant as gross income in 2002 by 
the South African Revenue Services (SARS). The Appellant objected to this assessment and 
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having lost in the High Court in Bloemfontein, it appealed to the Supreme Court of Appeal56. It 
is the Judgement at the Supreme Court of Appeal that this Thesis will discuss.  
 
The Court ruled that the compensation received was in fact of a revenue nature57. The argument 
advanced by SARS was as follows:  the first question, SARS contended, that needed to be 
answered was the nature of the agreement. By the facts presented in the above paragraphs, the 
agreement was a trade agreement.  This is an important question to ask as compensation paid for 
the early termination of a trade agreement may be of a revenue nature despite the cases analysed 
in section 3 of this thesis concluding that the receipts were of a capital nature.  
 
Bu t more than the above, the following has to be assessed in the evaluation of the nature of 
compensation receipts: first, the manner in which the compensation receipt calculated58. For 
instance, compensation receipts are sometimes calculated with reference to lost revenue that 
resulted from the early termination of the contract or with reference to the value of the lost right 
afforded to the taxpayer by the contract. But the presiding judge in the WJ Fourie Beleggings 
maintained that in this case, the compensation was paid for the loss of profit (which is of a 
revenue nature) that the Appellant had suffered because the members left the hotel before the end 
of the contract59. It follows then that the compensation itself was of a revenue nature too.   
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This leads to the second factor to be considered when assessing the nature of compensation 
receipts:  the intentions of the parties when paying or receiving the compensation.  If the parties, 
as is the circumstance in WJ Fourie Beleggings case, understood the money to be compensation 
for lost profits during the time of negotiations then the compensation is of a revenue nature. The 
alternative to this, which does not apply in this case, is if both parties had intended the 
compensation to be for the loss of a capital asset which would suggest that the compensation 
receipt was of a capital nature.   
 
This distinction underscores the third factor  that is important in assessing the nature of 
compensation receipts which is that the income earning structure - the capital asset - has to be 
correctly identified. In this case, the hotel (albeit leased) was the income generating structure.  It 
was thus incorrect to argue that the capital asset was the sole right to accommodate students 
which was afforded by the contract to the Appellant60.  
 
This is important as the fourth factor is to determine how important the terminated contract was 
to the capital asset identified.  An evaluation of the evidence presented to the Court would lead 
any objective person to conclude that the contract facilitated the operating of the capital asset, the 
hotel, which was already there albeit leased61.  The ability of the Appellant to work the capital 
asset (which was the hotel had remained intact) was in no way inhibited by the termination of 
this contract.  Yes, the students had damaged the hotel but this is the normal risk taken in the 
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nature of this industry. The damages did not impair the capital asset by making it unworkable. 
So, to use the Leach AJA’s words: “[the contract was] therefore a product of the appellant’s 
income earning activities, not the means by which it earned income… [and therefore] the 
appellant’s contract with Naschem cannot be construed as being an asset of a capital [nature]”62. 
 
His judgement was that the compensation received was in fact of a revenue nature. He held that 
the loss of the contract was not severe enough to undermine the income earning structure of the 
taxpayer, WJ Fourie Beleggings63. Had it been, then (by deduction) the compensation receipt 
would be of a capital nature as it was paid for impaired a capital asset.  Furthermore, from the 
evidence presented to the Court, the hotel, an income generating structure, had to be altered to 
secure the contract. But the fact that the Appellant had to effect changes to the structure of the 
hotel to secure the contract does not in any way affect the nature of compensation received. 
Changes to the physical structure of an already established and functioning capital asset- the 
hotel- does not affect the nature of the receipt.  
 
An observation one can take from the Judgment is that, the significance of the loss suffered by 
the early termination of the contract also does not in itself change the nature of the compensation 
received.  Consider that members had occupied two thirds of the hotel during their stay. This 
points to how significant the loss of forgone revenue was for the Appellant who had to turn 
several clients away during length of the member’s stay. The last observation that can be made 
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from the Judgement is that where the intension of the parties is to compensate for loss of profit, it 
can be concluded that the compensation was of a revenue nature.   
 
Now, the conclusion that compensation received was of a revenue nature is not in any way 
changed by what the Appellant actually uses the money received for.  In the WJ Beleggings case, 
the Appellant used the money to settle debt. However had they used it for improving, not 
repairing, the hotel then the expenditure would be capital in nature and would be duly capitalised 
to the cost of the hotel.  However, the initial compensation receipt would still remain revenue in 
nature for all the reasons noted above.  
 
SARS  had relied on three cases in its argument that the compensation received was of a capital 
nature: Taueber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd vs. Secretary for Inland Revenue, ITC 1341 and ITC 
1259. Given the analysis of these cases in section 2 of this thesis, it is clear that in all cases the 
presiding Judges had ruled that the compensation received by the Appellant for the termination 
of a contract was of a capital nature. In the Taueber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd vs. Secretary for 
Inland Revenue case, the Appellant was the sole distributor of the products sold by the 
counterparty (principal). This agency relationship also entailed that the Appellant not sell any 
products that competed with the products of the principal64. When the agreement was terminated, 
the principal gave a sum of money to the Appellant as compensation for early termination of the 
contract. The presiding Judge Rumpff CJ defended his ruling - which was that the sum of money 
was indeed capital -  by arguing that what the agency relationship entailed that, for the term of 
                                                       




that contract, the agent was restrained from earning income from that part of the income-earning 
structure that sold products that competing with that of the principal65. Therefore the sole right 
afforded to the Appellant by the distribution agreement was the capital asset.  As this structure 
was of a capital nature, it followed then that the compensation paid when this agreement was 
terminated was also of a capital nature.  
 
In ITC 1341 the presiding Judge observed that the contract resulted in the formation of a business 
structure whose only revenue was earned from the receipts of monies from the member 
company. As the contract was terminated that income earning structure - a capital asset - was 
severed66. Compensation thus received was of a capital nature. Likewise in ITC 1259, a contract 
had also necessitated the formation of a separate income earning structure by the Appellant from 
that of its normal course of business67. Termination of the contract meant the destruction of this 
separate structure and the Judge ruled that the compensation received was of a capital nature. An 
important observation to make is what the common denominator in the three cases is: income 
was generated from the contracts in question68. 
 
But the overriding reason why the presiding Judge Leach ruled that compensation received by 
WJ Fourie Beleggings was of a revenue nature was that he believed that the contract in question 
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was essentially different to the cases above69. WJ Fourie Beleggings could generate an income 
without the contract with Naschem. It remained a hotelier before and after the contract with 
Naschem. It does not follow then that the contract was the means to earn income albeit the most 
significant income generator for the business during the contract term.  Here then lies the 
overriding principle that determines whether compensation received for termination of contracts 
is of a capital or revenue nature: it is only capital if the contract gave rise to an income earning 
structure.  
 
B. Analysis of Case 11470 and its appeal in the Supreme Court of Appeal in - 
Stellenbosch Farmers’ Winery v Commissioner for SA Revenue Service [2012] 
ZASCA 72  
 
The facts of Case 1147070 as presented in the Tax Court were that ABC Ltd had entered into a 
distribution agreement with F Co.  The agreement entailed that ABC Ltd be the sole distributors 
of JK, YZ and ST whiskeys to South Africa Swaziland, Botswana and Lesotho for 10 years 
starting 1 February 1991.   In 1997, structural changes in Europe, where F Co was based, 
resulted in it having to terminate the distribution agreement between itself and ABC Ltd. 
Negotiations ensued and in 27 August 1998, the agreement was terminated and F Co paid ABC 
Ltd R67 million71.  The agreement had been terminated some 41 months before the end of the 
contract date72.  South African Revenue Services issued, for the 1999 tax year, an assessment 
that recognised as gross receipts the full R67 million that ABC Ltd received from the termination 
of the distribution agreement. Additionally SARS levied interest on the said amount.  ABC Ltd 
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maintained that the money was of a capital nature and should thus not have been charged income 
tax on it. ABC Ltd, however, lost the case. It appealed to the Tax Court where it lost and finally 
the case was heard before the Supreme Court of Appeal. Judges J Louw and Kroon AJA presided 
on the former and the latter respectively.  
 
Before an analysis of this case can ensue, it is rather important to speak about the nature of the 
distribution agreement and the effect it had on the business of ABC Ltd. Previously, wholesalers 
like ABC Ltd could freely import liquor made by F Co and sell it to retailers. What the 
distribution agreement constituted was a guaranteed distribution right given solely to ABC Ltd to 
import and then sell the JK, ST and YZ whiskeys (collectively called JK in the Judgement) to the 
four markets in South Africa, Swaziland, Lesotho and Botswana. On the other hand it also 
disallowed ABC Ltd to sell whiskeys that competed directly with JK73.   
 
Judge Louw of the Tax Court made Judgements on two issues: first, whether the R67 million 
was of a revenue or capital nature and secondly; whether SARS correctly charged the interest 
from the late payment of the tax on the R 67 million74.  On the first issue the Appellant, ABC 
Ltd, made the argument below.  
 
The first point that ABC made was that, the agreement constituted a distribution right and as that 
right was of a capital nature so then was the compensation received from losing it which was the 
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direct result of terminating of the agreement. The Appellant relied on several cases like Estate 
AG Bourke v CIR75and contended that the monies received was to “fill a hole” in the income 
earning structure which was the business- a capital asset76. The JK brand, it continued, 
contributed over a fifth to its total income. Therefore the termination of this agreement meant a 
loss of much more than an insignificant portion of the income of ABC Ltd. Also poignant 
however, in the demonstration that the agreement constituted an asset, was the fact that the 
distribution right afforded ABC Ltd with leverage that allowed it to promote its other products. 
That is to say ABC Ltd could, given the popularity of the JK brand, demand to have its other 
products placed in the premier locations within a retail store at which the JK brand was being 
sold77.   
 
This, the Appellant concluded, showed that the agreement provided it with much more than just 
income but it was the asset from which additional income was attained that affected other brands 
in its business. The termination of the contract that brought about the sterilization of the 
distributive right (a capital asset) resulted in an income decline of about 30% in 199978.  The 
losses continued in 2000 with a further reduction in income of almost 20%79. The losses were so 
catastrophic that ABC Ltd had to structurally change its business by merging with LC 
Corporation to avoid bankruptcy in 2001.  
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Despite the taxpayer’s arguments, Judge Louw ruled against the taxpayer advancing the 
following as his reason: the evidence brought before the court, he charged, showed that the 
compensation paid did not relate to the value of the right over the remaining 41 months. Rather 
the figure was based on the value of lost future profits. The amount was thus paid to fill a hole in 
the Appellant’s profit.  As such the compensation was of a revenue nature, concluded Judge 
Louw.  However, the Appellant, the Judge continued, was correct that the distribution right 
constituted a capital asset. But that right does not in itself constitute a business. ABC Ltd does 
not carry on the business of buying and selling distribution rights, he charged80. So, it does not 
follow then that the right was a business, and in that way, a capital asset. 
 
The taxpayer appealed Judge Louw’s judgement at the Supreme Court of Appeal. Kroon AJA 
was the presiding Judge in the Supreme Court of Appeal. In his ruling Kroon AJA agreed with 
Judge Louw that the Appellant did not conduct the business of selling the right to purchase 
alcohol. But Kroon AJA went further. He argued that as the Appellant was not in the business of 
buying and selling liquor licences and it thus did not conduct a scheme of profit making doing 
so81.  Rather, the terminated contract impaired the distribution right (a capital asset) it previously 
afforded to the appellant. The Appellant was successful in proving that the compensation was of 
a capital nature.   The respected Judge thus did not uphold the ruling made in the tax court by 
Judge Louw.  
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The Kroon AJA maintained that Judge Louw observation that the fact that the compensation 
amount was calculated in relation to the profits forgone and not the value of the distribution 
right, which the Judge used to deduce that the compensation was thus of a revenue nature was in 
fact incorrect82. Nowhere, argued Judge Kroon, was there any reference made in the evidence 
presented that the compensation was payment for lost profit83. The Judge ruled that the 
compensation was of a capital nature, given the fact that the distribution right had been impaired 
by the termination of the contract. 
 
But there was another matter presented by the Appellant to both the Tax Court and the Supreme 
Court of Appeal. SARS had charged, in accordance with Section 89 of the Income Tax Act, 
interest and penalties on the late payment of the tax on the compensation receipt.  The Appellant, 
ABC, argued that it had acted on the advice of tax consultants who said that the R67 million 
would attract neither VAT nor income tax. As such, ABC Ltd had neither wished to defraud 
SARS nor hide this receipt in its financial statements by not declaring it.  Having sought legal 
counsel, which turned out to have given the wrong advice, ABC Ltd argued that this had created 
unfortunate circumstances outside its control. This wrong advise now prejudiced it as it was  
liable to pay the interest due on income tax it was advised would not be payable.  
 
Judge Louw of the Tax Court responded to this by exercising the authority given to him by 
Section 89 quat (5) and ruled that the interest be waived and that ABC Ltd not be liable for the 
                                                       





interest SARS wanted it to pay. The Supreme Court of Appeal agreed with this Judgement and 
SARS’s assessment was set aside84. 
 
5. The Nuances Described  
 
An analysis into the cases discussed in section 3 and 4 above has revealed the following as 
considerations Judges have given regard to when assessing whether compensation received is of 
a capital or revenue nature. The first consideration was the significance of the revenue that 
resulted from the contract in relation to total revenue (Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR).  
This consideration also encompasses deliberations of how many incumbent businesses the 
taxpayer has and their importance to its income generating structure versus the importance of the 
business that the terminated contract afforded the taxpayer (Allied Mills Industries (Pty) Ltd v 
Federal Commissioner of Taxation).  
 
Second is the result of the contract - that is if the contract had resulted in taxpayer having to 
increase the capacity of its existing income earning structure (ITC 1259) and (BOS v C:SARS 
(TPD) or not. If the contract resulted in the formation of a separate income earning structure, 
compensation received from the termination of the contract was likely to be of a capital nature.  
 
                                                       




Thirdly, the intent of the parties when determining the compensation amount is also important. 
The prima facie intension of both parties in negotiating compensation for a terminated contact 
may differ between negotiations centred on measuring compensation due in reference to an 
anticipated loss in earnings or valuing a right afforded to the taxpayer by the contract (Allied 
Mills Industries (Pty) Ltd v Federal Commissioner of Taxation and Case 11470). The intension is 
usually evident in the manner in which the compensation amount was calculated. If 
compensation is measured in reference of a valuing a right, then the compensation is of a capital 
nature. If compensation is measured by valuing forgone income, then it is of a revenue nature. 
Fourthly, the frequency of the compensation payments and the timing of its receipt have an 
impact in the determination of whether compensation receipts are of a capital or revenue nature 
as seen in Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT . 
 
However, the overriding criteria in determining whether compensation be of a revenue or capital 
nature is if the termination of the contract resulted in the permanent impairment of the income 
generating structure (WJ Fourie Beleggings CC v Commissioner (SARS) 2009 (5) SA 238 (SCA), 
ITC 1259 and ITC 1341). Silke (2010: 3-14) concurs as he concludes that compensation received 
for giving up a capital asset or impairing an income producing structure is of a capital nature. 
Compensation received for the termination of a trade contract, he continues, is of a capital nature 
if it represents a large portion of the income earning structure of the taxpayer. With these 
nuances described, what follows next is a miniature case study that demonstrates the effect of 




6. Case Study and its Analysis 
 
This section of the thesis seeks to demonstrate the principles mentioned in section 3 - 5. The 
demonstration will take the form of a case study. This is so because a case study presents the best 
opportunity in which the facets of the principles learned can be demonstrated. The facts of this 
study are fictitious and are used only for demonstrative purposes. Assume that all entities have 
the same financial year end of 31 August.  
 
Bopeng Consulting (Pty) Ltd was formed by Duma Bopeng 27 years ago. The entity is a 
business consulting firm. However the services offered excluded tax advisory as Bopeng lacked 
the staff and expertise to offer these services to their clientele.   This all changed, however, in 
October 2008 when there was a change in the shareholding of Bopeng.  Xu (Pty) Ltd - a 
consulting firm - bought 40% of the shares in Bopeng. The incumbent shareholders, Bopeng 
Family Trust and Bopeng key management, each held 50 percent of Bopeng.  In October 2008, 
the incumbent shareholders chose to sell an equal percentage (20% each) of their shareholding to 
Xu. It is in that way Xu acquired 40% of the company.  
 
The acquisition was a strategic move for Xu Ltd. Its business strategy was to grow by acquiring 
small competitor firms like Bopeng. As said Xu, like Bopeng, is also a consulting firm but has a 
much broader service line which includes tax advisory.  The 40% acquisition meant that the staff 




be on a temporary basis. All equipment, additional office space and permanent staff would have 
to be hired and acquired by Bopeng for tax service contracts Bopeng may acquire in future.  
 
With the impetus of the expertise support anticipated from Xu, Bopeng quickly marketed its 
newly established tax advisory division. The first contract acquired by this division was that of 
Sechaba (Pty) Ltd on 1 April 2009. This contract entailed that Bopeng Consulting provide tax 
advisory services to Sechaba for a term of 7 years ending on 1 April 2016. The contract was 
effective 1 April 2009.  
 
Given the significance of the revenue to be made from the contract in its duration and additional 
capacity it required, Bopeng acquired equipment, office space and hired permanent staff to work 
exclusively on the Sechaba contract. This investment in additional capacity was also made in the 
hope that more tax advisory contracts would materialise as Bopeng’s reputation grew as a tax 
consultant. 
 
The contract went ahead as planned and for almost 4 years both parties, Sechaba and Bopeng, 
honoured their respective sides of the contract. Unbeknownst to Bopeng, Sechaba started 
experiencing financial difficulties as early as November 2011. On May 2013 Sechaba, unable to 
continue using the services of Bopeng, terminated the contract and offered to pay compensation 




difficulties experienced by Sechaba, opted to accept the compensation in lieu of receiving 
nothing at all as it believed Sechaba would soon be liquidated. 
 
A sum of R4 million was the compensation received and legal counsel from both sides agreed 
that this was the estimated amount of forgone revenue from the contract. Bopeng was quite keen 
on getting the compensation amount has high as it can because, despite, every effort to obtain 
other significant tax advisory contracts, Bopeng had never managed to secure a contract as 
significant as the Sechaba contract.  
 
The termination of the Sechaba contract meant that all the capacity that was acquired to service 
the newly formed tax advisory department of Bopeng was now idle. Bopeng management 
advised the shareholders that the cost inefficiencies of this department and the fact that it had 
failed to secure other contracts meant that it must be closed down to avoid further losses. Thus, 
management concluded, the shutdown of the tax division will be done in the financial year ended 
2014, i.e. in the next financial year. 
 
The issue under investigation is the taxable nature of the compensation receipt of R4 million and 
how will it be taxed in the year of assessment ended 2013 which is the year of its receipt.  The 
first consideration is the significance of the Sechaba contract to the revenue of the tax advisory 
department (Taeuber and Corssen (Pty) Ltd v SIR). The case study above says that the Sechaba 




to the time it was terminated, it was the single largest contributor to the income of the tax 
advisory department.  It is argued that the significance of the Sechaba contract to Bopeng itself 
should not be considered as the issue here as the tax advisory department was the additional 
capacity directly created to service Sechaba and it is the importance of that contract to the tax 
advisory department that must be considered.  
 
This leads to the second consideration. The tax advisory department was formed as a direct result 
of the Sechaba contract and extra capacity was created to service that contract (ITC 1259). Thus 
an income- earning asset was created as a result of this contract .After the termination of the 
contract, the equipment and people employed in the tax advisory department were rendered idle. 
So the significance of the Sechaba contract would lead one to belief that the termination of the 
contract sterilised the income producing asset - the tax advisory department - and thus the 
compensation receipts were of a capital nature. This principle is demonstrated by ITC 1259. 
 
The case study mentioned that the R4 million was an agreed upon estimate of the anticipated lost 
earnings that resulted from the termination of the contract.  The principle that came out of Case 
11470 was that the nature of the compensation receipt can also be determined by evaluating the 
intention of the parties when estimating the compensation amount. The parties can estimate the 
compensation to be lost income, as was the case in the case study.   Under these circumstances, 
the nature of the compensation receipts can be revenue. Alternatively, the parties may have 
estimated the compensation receipt to be the value of the lost asset - e.g. a distribution right.  The 




capital asset. But presiding Judge J Louw of Case 11470 does make the important point later in 
the judgement that the method of calculating the compensation is important but not by itself 
indicative of the nature of the receipts85. He ruled that the compensation was paid to fill a hole in 
profits and, like in the case study, this contributed to making it of a revenue nature. 
 
The manner or frequency in which the compensation receipts are received does not, as learned 
from in Heavy Minerals Pty Ltd v FCT, alter their taxable nature.  Whether the compensation 
receipt is a lumpsum or recurring amount, the nature of the receipts are thereby not altered. 
 
But perhaps the consideration that best indicates the nature of the compensation receipt is 
whether the termination of the Sechaba contract impaired the income earning structure of 
Bopeng.  So far, many of the considerations above have led to the suggestion that the 
compensation receipts may be of a capital nature. But a different conclusion may have been 
arrived at if there was no tax advisory department created because of the contract.  
 
Consider this; if the contract necessitated the use of resources already possessed by Bopeng, then 
one may argue that the contract only used the income earning asset already possessed by Bopeng 
and that the termination of the contract did not sterilise the income earning asset Bopeng already 
had and continues to have.  Similar to WJ Fourie Beleggings, Bopeng’s income earning structure 
had not been sterilised by the termination of the Sechaba contract. Under these circumstances 
                                                       





then, the compensation received was of a revenue nature. This, it is argued, is re-enforced by the 
fact that the compensation been received for lost income, further demonstrating the fact that the 
sum was in fact of a revenue nature. The fact that Bopeng had unsuccessfully attempted to 
branch into tax advisory does not make the compensation received to be of a capital nature. The 
termination of the contract did not sterilise the income earning structure of Bopeng which is the 
taxable entity and not the tax advisory department, it is concluded. As so this finding of the case 
study re-enforces the principles of WJ Fourie Beleggings which is the authority of  terminated 
trade contracts and their the taxable nature. The principle of the WJ Fourie Beleggings case in 
relation to the case study is that just as Bopeng continued to be a consulting firm before and after 
the termination of the Sechaba contract (like WJ Fourie Beleggings continued to be a hotelier 
after the termination of the Naschem contract), the compensation received by both entities from 




The objective of the thesis was to evaluate Case Law on the termination of trade contracts and 
the nature of compensation received. Before this could be done basic concepts were explained: 
capital vs. revenue nature. An explanation then ensued of the types of contracts available and the 
discussion was said to be limited its trade contracts and the termination thereof. Case Law on this 
subject was analysed from recent history to the current authority on this subject. Cases from 
other jurisdictions were also discussed to demonstrate principles those courts have considered in 




Then after, the application of the learnt principles was done by the means of a case study. 
Together with the evaluation of Case Law, the principles discussed in the case study are intended 
to inform taxpayers of the main characteristics that Judges consider in evaluating whether 
receipts are of a capital or revenue nature. Yes, each taxpayers circumstances will differ, but the 
provided principles can be used by each taxpayer to evaluate the nature of their compensation 
receipt and the taxpayer’s success of any appeal against assessments made by the Tax Authority.  
If used in this way, the original intention of this thesis would be achieved which is to assist 
taxpayers to pay less tax by ensuring that the circumstances prevailing in the Cases discussed 
which led to a ruling that the nature of the compensation receipts are of a capital nature are 
similar to their own circumstances so that the compensation receipts may also be of a capital 
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